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CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw-CoMMBRCE CLAUSE-STATE STATUTE REQUIRING 
lNTERsTATE MoroR CARRIER TO SECURE A PERMIT-Petitioner brought an 
action in an Arkansas state court to enjoin enforcement of a state statute which 
required all contract carriers using the highways of the state to secure a permit 
from the state Public Service Commission.1 The Arkansas Supreme Court 
found that five driver-owners who had been arrested while transporting peti-
tioner's product in interstate commerce without such a permit were "contract 
carriers" within the meaning of the statute. Neither petitioner nor any of the 
drivers had applied for a state permit. Under the terms of the statute, granting 
of the permit was contingent on certain factors, such as the financial reliability 
of the applicant, applicant's sense of responsibility to the public, and the existing 
and proposed transportation service.2 • Held,. four justices dissenting, the require-
ment of such a permit imposes no undue burden on interstate commence because 
there was no showing that the state will ever attempt to impose any of the 
apprehended burdensome conditions as prerequisite to the granting of the 
16 Ark Stat. (1947) §73-1701 et seq., known as Arkansas Motor Carrier Act, 1941. 
2Jd., §73-1712. 
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permit. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co. -v. Wood, 344 U.S. 157, 73 S.Ct. 204 
(1952). 
It has been quite uniformly recognized since Gibbons -v. Ogden8 in 1824 
that the grant of power to Congress under the commerce clause4 necessarily 
implies some degree of limitation on a state's power to regulate interstate 
commerce. 5 The most widely accepted view has been that a state retains the 
power to regulate commerce as to local matters not requiring uniform national 
legislation until Congress acts to displace this power. 6 The problem of the 
principal case, the constitutionality of a state statute which requires an inter-
state motor carrier to obtain a permit as a condition precedent to use of the 
highways of the state, was first considered by the Supreme Court in Buck -v. 
Kuykendall. 7 In that case the Court held that a state could not refuse a permit 
to an interstate motor carrier on the ground that existing transportation facilities 
were adequate, since this constituted an obstruction of interstate commerce 
and contravened the implied prohibition of the commerce clause.8 Subsequent 
cases, however, have established some important distinctions. A state may 
validly impose safety, health or conservation regulations on carriers, even though 
they are engaged exclusively in interstate commerce, these being deemed 
essentially "local" problems under the prevailing view.9 Thus, a state may 
deny an interstate motor carrier permission to use a specific highway on the 
basis of traffic congestion;10 it may impose reasonable size and weight limitations 
on interstate carriers as a conservation measure;11 it may revoke an interstate 
s 9 Wheat. (22 U.S.) 1 (1824). 
4 U.S. CoNsT., art. I, §8: "The Congress shall have Power ••• To regulate Commerce 
with foreign Nations, and among the several States. • •• " 
5 In Gibbons v. Ogden, note 3 supra, Chief Justice Marshall asserted that the power 
of Congress over interstate commerce was exclusive, subject only to police power regulation 
by the states. 
6 This approach was first advanced in Cooley v. Port Wardens of Philadelphia, 12 
How. (53 U.S.) 299 (1851). This test was followed by Stone, C.J., in Southern Pacific 
Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 65 S.Ct. 1515 (1945). See also Panhandle Eastern Pipe 
Line Co. v. Michigan Public Service Commission, 341 U.S. 329, 71 S.Ct. 777 (1951). 
The enactment of the Federal Motor Carrier Act of 1935 displaced certain powers of the 
states to regulate interstate motor carriers, e.g., to prescribe maximum hours of service and 
qualifications of drivers. See 49 Stat. L. 546 (1935), 49 U.S.C. (1946) §304. Current 
regulations may be found in 49 C.F.R. §191.1 et seq. (1949). On displacement, see 
comment, 60 HAnv. L. Rsv. 262 (1946). The interstate contract carriers involved in the 
principal case are required to secure a permit from the Interstate Commerce Commission 
under this act. 49 U.S.C. (1946) §309. 
7 267 U.S. 307, 45 S.Ct. 324 (1925). 
Blbid. Bush Co. v. Malloy, 267 U.S. 317, 45 S.Ct. 326 (1925), decided the same 
day, also held that a state could not refuse a permit to an interstate carrier on the basis 
that existing transportation facilities were adequate. 
9 For a thorough treatment of this subject and a collection of the earlier cases, see 
Kauper, "State Regulation of Interstate Motor Carriers," 31 MrcH. L. R.Ev. 920, 1097 
(1933). 
10 Bradley v. Public Utilities Commission of Ohio, 289 U.S. 92, 53 S.Ct. 577 (1933). 
11 South Carolina State Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Brothers, 303 U.S. 177, 58 S.Ct. 
510 (1938). See also Maurer v. Hamilton, 309 U.S. 598, 60 S.Ct. 726 (1940) which 
held valid a state statute that prohibited operations of vehicles carrying another vehicle 
above the cab or over the head of the operator on state highways. See comment on size and 
weight limitations, 36 MrcH. L. Rsv. 443 (1938). 
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carrier's permit when the carrier has disobeyed a state law prohibiting the 
transaction of intrastate business on an interstate permit;12 or it may validly 
prohibit interstate shipments of liquor by carriers other than those authorized 
by the state.13 Recent decisions have indicated that the Court will go far in 
upholding local regulations which require a permit or license when it can :6.nd 
that the activity is essentially "local" in aspect, even though the result is to 
regulate interstate commerce.14 
In the principal case, both the majority and the dissenters seemed to over-
look the true import of Clark v. Poor15 decided only two years after Buck v. 
Kuykendall.16 In the Clark case, the Ohio statute requiring the motor carrier 
to obtain a permit was similar to the Arkansas statute in the principal case, 
and provided that the permit could be refused when existing transportation 
facilities were adequate.17 As in the principal case, an injunction was sought 
but refused by the Supreme Court because the carrier had not been refused a 
permit-the carrier had made no application for one-and because state officials 
had expressly disclaimed any right to refuse a permit to any carrier engaged in 
interstate commerce.18 In these respects, the principal case would seem to be 
substantially on all fours with Clark v. Poor. It is submitted that the result 
is sound in both of the cases, but that the Court in each case failed to give 
its real reason for refusing the injunction. It would seem that what the Court 
was really doing was employing its well-known judicial technique of avoiding 
the constitutional issue whenever possible.19 In neither case had the state 
refused the interstate carrier a permit on the grounds outlawed by Buck v. 
Kuykendall,20 and it is not at all certain that the state courts would have allowed 
such a refusal, since both acts contained provis!ons that the statute should not 
be construed so as to conllict with the federal power to regulate interstate 
commerce.21 It is suggested that the Court should have refused to anticipate 
the question of constitutional law and refrained from determining the validity 
12 Eichholz v. Public Service Commission of Missouri, 306 U.S. 268, 59 S.Ct. 532 
(1939). 
13 Ziffrin, Inc. v. Reeves, 308 U.S. 132, 60 S.Ct. 163 (1939). See also Duckworth 
v. Arkansas, 314 U.S. 390, 62 S.Ct. 311 (1941), holding valid a state statute requiring all 
transporters of liquor through the state to secure a permit for identification purposes. 
14 Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. Michigan Public Service Commission, note 6 
supra; Buck v. California, 343 U.S. 99, 72 S.Ct. 502 (1952). Cf. California v. Zook, 336 
U.S. 725, 69 S.Ct. 841 (1949). 
15 274 U.S. 554, 47 S.Ct. 702 (1927). 
16 In both Buck v. Kuykendall and Clark v. Poor, the majority opinion was written 
by Brandeis, J. 
17 Ohio Gen. Code (Throckmorton, 1926) §614-87. This same statute is now found 
in Ohio Rev. Code (Baldwin, 1953) §4921.10. 
18 Clark v. Poor, note 15 supra. Accord: Columbia Terminals Co. v. Lambert, (D.C. 
D.C. 1939) 30 F. Supp. 28, app. dismissed and holding essentially affd. 309 U.S. 620, 60 
S.Ct. 471 (1940). 
10 For a good example of this approach, see Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. McLaughlin, 
323 U.S. 101, 65 S.Ct. 152 (1944). 
20 I.e., that the area the carrier proposed to serve already had adequate transportation 
facilities. 
216 Ark. Stat. (1947) §73-1726; Ohio Gen. Code (Page, 1946) §614-101 [omitted 
from Ohio Rev. Code (Baldwin, 1953)]. 
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of the state statute until applied and interpreted by the state,22 or that the 
Court should have granted the injunction restraining the state commission 
from imposing any of the alleged burdensome conditions as applied to carriers 
engaged in interstate commerce. 
Marvin 0. Young, S.Ed. 
22 ''The mere susceptibility of a statute to a construction which could render it un-
constitutional does not afford sufficient ground for injunctive relief where, as here, it does 
not appear that the Statute has ever been so construed, where the enforcing authorities 
affirm a recognition of its unconstitutionality if so construed and disclaim any intention to 
do so .••• " Columbia Terminals Co. v. Lambert, (D.C. Mo. 1939) 30 F. Supp. 28 at 32. 
